Line-Item Veto Proposal Would Give President Authority to Cut Programs
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What is a Line-Item Veto?
One of the top priorities of the Bush administration and some in
Congress is to pass legislation giving the President line-item veto
authority. Under existing law, when Congress passes an appropriation
(spending) bill, the President may either sign the bill into law
or veto the bill. If the President vetoes the bill, Congress may
attempt to enact the bill into law by overriding the President’s
veto by a two-thirds vote of both the House and the Senate. The
President must either approve the entire bill or disapprove the
entire bill.
Line-item veto authority would allow the President to sign an appropriation
bill into law but single out one or more specific spending provisions
in that bill for a veto. Under the most recent line-item veto proposal,
Congress would then have to vote on whether to approve the proposed
vetoes.
Proponents of a Presidential line-item veto have suggested that
giving the President this new authority to single out specific items
in appropriations bills would force Congress to become more fiscally
disciplined. But in fact, the latest line-item veto proposal could
help the President to cancel funding for nearly any service or program,
even if a large majority of Congress supports that funding.
Line-Item Veto Proposal Would Give the President Unprecedented
Authority
The most recent proposal to give the President line-item veto
authority is a contained in a bill by Senator Judd Gregg called
S. 3521. The Gregg bill goes well beyond the traditional concept
of the line-item veto in several significant ways:
- It significantly extends the amount of time the President
has to propose a veto. The President would have up to one year after
a bill is passed by Congress to propose the veto of individual items
in the bill. The President could then choose to withhold the appropriated
funds for 45 days after submitting a veto request to Congress. The
President could even use this new procedure to withhold some appropriated
funds through the end of a fiscal year, which could cause the authority
to spend those funds to expire and the appropriation to be cancelled.
- It allows the President to continue to withhold funds even
after Congress votes down a proposed veto. Even if Congress votes
down a proposed line-item veto of program funding, the President
could continue to withhold funds for that program up to the limit
of 45 days.
- It allows the President to “bundle” vetoed items
from several different bills into one package, making it more difficult
for the Congress to override the veto.
- It would allow the President to propose line-item vetoes
of provisions in other bills, not just annual appropriations legislation.
Under the Gregg bill, the President could also veto provisions to
improve or expand entitlement programs, such as Medicare, Medicaid,
and Food Stamps. This would give the President significant new power
to influence the funding and structure of these services.
Federal Line-Item Veto Different from Minnesota’s
Some proponents of a Presidential line-item veto have noted that
the governors of many states, including Minnesota, currently have
such line-item authority; that is, they may veto individual items
in appropriations bills passed by their state legislatures.
This argument, however, incorrectly assumes that the proposed federal
line-item veto would work the same way it does at the state level.
As we’ve seen above, it would not. Unlike what the Gregg bill
proposes, the governor of Minnesota is not permitted to continue
withholding appropriations after the governor’s line-item
veto has been defeated by the Legislature. Neither may the governor
bundle together line-item vetoes from separate appropriations bills
in order to make it more difficult for the Legislature to override
the governor’s line-item vetoes.
An Invitation to Mischief
Some assert that new line-item veto authority for the President
would be used against so-called wasteful “pork barrel”
spending or “earmarks” (when a member of Congress adds
spending items helpful to his or her district into large appropriations
bills in order to ease their passage). However, there is nothing
in the Gregg bill’s line-item veto authority that would limit
the President’s line-item veto just to earmarks.
In addition, there is nothing to prevent the President from using
line-item veto authority to gain negotiating leverage or bargaining
power, just as members of Congress engage in whenever they write
and pass appropriations bills or, for that matter, any other kind
of legislation. A president could spare the programs of political
allies from strict scrutiny while using or threatening to use the
line-item veto to delay or cancel funding for the programs of political
adversaries. A president could threaten to use the line-item veto
in order to gain a senator’s or representative’s support
on some other piece of legislation. And it would make it more difficult
to craft compromises as legislators would have no guarantee that
the President would not line-item veto portions of a carefully negotiated
compromise.
In short, there is no guarantee that new line-item veto authority
for the President will produce better fiscal policy. And the notion
that the President will somehow be above political considerations
in using line-item veto authority is unsupportable.
Better Ways to Achieve Accountability
If the goal of line-item veto proponents is to stop the use of
earmarks in appropriations bills, Congress can do this already.
Congress could more carefully screen items which are added into
appropriations bills both in committee and on the House and Senate
floor. The Senate in particular could begin enforcing a “germaneness”
rule like the House to prevent unrelated items from being added
to appropriation bills.
If the goal of line-item veto proponents is deficit reduction,
Congress could rededicate itself to a fair and balanced “pay-as-you-go”
(PAYGO) process which would require that both new spending and new
tax cuts be subject to stricter budget rules. Proponents of new
spending could be required to identify which programs would be cut
or what new revenue source would be available to pay for the new
spending. Similarly, proponents of tax cuts could be required to
identify which programs they would cut or what other new revenue
source would be used to pay for any new tax cut.
Finally, this line-item veto proposal would make it more difficult for the public to track and participate
in spending decisions about federal programs that affect the lives
of millions of Americans. It raises real questions about our democracy
if the President is allowed to cancel spending that has been approved
by the people’s representatives in Congress by circumventing
the process established in the Constitution for a Presidential veto
of legislation.
August 2006
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